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Abstract
In this paper a macroeconomic model of optimal profit taxation deve-
loped by Gradus (1991) is extended through incorporation of a tax rate on
pollution. Pollution is an inevitable by-product of production. It is
assumed that the firms own two different stocks of capital goods. The
first one is productive and the second one is nonproductive but cleans
pollution.
The problem is modelled as a Stackelberg differential game such that
the government is the leader; the firms and consumers are the followers
playing Nash against each other. The paper elaborates on the investment
and tax policies resulting from the open-loop and feedback equilibria and
on the question whether the profit tax or the pollution tax should be used
ns nn inst.rument te reduce pollut.inn. Tt. turns out. t,hnt. in the open-1neF,
eyuilibria tax policiey are time-lucuttslaLeut, but leu~l Lu hi~;her lcvcl5
of welfare. Furthermore, we simulate the consequences if new information
about the Greenhouse effect is announced.
1. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, during which a clean environment more and more has
become a scarce commodity, economists have shown an increasing interest in
the problem of reducing the pollution output of firms. An important ques-
tion in this respect is what kind of policy instruments the government, in
its role as social planner, should choose to reduce the level of pollu-
tion. One class of instruments includes direct controls by setting limits
to specific elements like, for instance, restrictions on the output level
or on pollution emissions. These limits are known as standards and impli-
cations of different standards for the economic behavior within a static
framework are studied by Helfand (1991). Van der Ploeg and Withagen (1991)
argue that standards are difficult to enforce and lead to high administra-
tive costs. Therefore they prefer imposing an emission tax rate as an
instrument for the government to reduce pollution output.2
The influence of an emission tax and subsidies on cleaner investment
activities on the behavior of a profit maximizing firm was studied in a
paper by Kort, Van Loon and Luptacik (1991). It turned out that offering
investment grants is most effective with respect to diminishing pollution
output when the costs of investment are relatively high. On other hand
imposing an emission tax rate is better when the abatement to capital
ratio is relatively high. However, a major drawback of this model is that
the policy of the government, i.e. fixing the emission tax rate, is taken
exogenously in the sense that only the behavior of the firm is maximized.
By doing this the Lucas critique (cf. Lucas (1976)), which states that the
interactions between private and public sector should be evaluated when we
want to establish the incidences of different tax rates, is not taken into
account. The Lucas critique can be dealt with by modelling the problem as
a dynamic game between private and public sector. Starting point of this
kind of research is a paper by Fischer (1980), where in a simple two-
period model the trade off between capital and labor tax is described.
Also the issue of time-inconsistency, which occurs when having distortio-
nary taxation, is discussed in that paper. The main conclusion is that if
the government commits its tax policy, it yields a higher level of wel-
fare. Later on the Fischer framework has been extended by many authors to
other tax rates (cf. Rogers (1987), Chang (1988)) and political aspects
(cf. Persson and Svensson (1989), Alesina and Tabellini (1987)). In this
paper the route of optimal taxation will be followed and attention is
focussed on the differences between the effects of imposing a profit tax
or an emission tax. Furthermore, we study whether these tax rates can be
time-inconsistent and, if this is the case, we elaborate on the economic
interpretation of such a time-inconsistency.
Starting point of the paper is the decentralized market model of Abel
and Blanchard (1983) in which the policy of the government was taken exo-
genously. In this paper a general equilibrium model with utility maximi-
zing consumers and value maximizing firms, which face costs of adjustment,
was presented and the incidences of different tax rates were analyzed. We
extend this research in two directions. First, we model the government's
behavior endogenously, where it maximizes the utility of a representative
agent. Here, we assume that the firms and consumers behave atomistically,
while the government is the leader within a Stackelberg game. We study the3
commitment and no-commitment solution of this game. Second, we incorporate
an emission tax rate. The same framework was used in Gradus and Kort
(1992), but in that paper pollution was modelled as a function of produc-
tive capital goods while here we take pollution as a function of produc-
tion. Through this latter feature it will turn out that, contrary to
Gradus and Kort (1992) governmental policy influences the optimal techno-
logy choice of the firm. This paper also extends Gradus and Kort (1992) in
that the feedback Stackelberg equilibria are calculated and analyzed.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we model the firms' and
consumers' decision problem. Furthermore, the equilibrium in the goods and
labor market is described while in Section 3 we present optimal govern-
ment's behavior under the condition that it takes into account the way
that agents make their decisions and that there is an open-loop informa-
tion structure. The feedback equilibrium is studied in Section 4 where
also a numerical example is presented. Finally, in Section 5 we conclude
this paper.
2. THE FIRM'S AND CONSUMER'S DECISION PROBLEM
For reasons of analytical tractability we assume that there is only one
representative type of consumer and firm.
2.1. The model of the firm
Consider a firm operating in an environment without exogenous uncer-
tainty. The firm produces a homogeneous output by means of its factors
capital and labor. The firm's output can be used for different kinds of
public and private spendings. With respect to the production function we
assume that capital and labor are substitutes and there is a constant
returns to scale technology, so that
q- f(k,~), f(k,0) - 0, f(0,.~) - 0, fk ~ 0, f~ ) 0, f~~fkk - fk~ - 0, (1)
where q, f, k and ~ denote the amount of production, the production func-
tion, the stock of capital goods and the number of employed workers.
As an inevitable by-product production causes pollution. In the litera-
ture there is some discussion about the source of pollution. For instance,4
Van der Ploeg and Withagen (1991) model pollution as a linear function of
production, while Feichtinger and Luptácik (1987) take pollution as a
convex function of the labor force. Luptácik and Schubert (1982) consider
three sources of pollution: consumption, production and the capital stock.
In this paper it is assumed that the amount of emissions is a linear func-
tion of production. Furthermore, it is assumed that pollution can be re-
duced through investment in a second kind of capital goods which is non-
productive. The amount by which pollution output is decreased is assumed
to be linearly dependent on the stock of those abatement capital goods
e - pq - mu, (2)
where e, u, p and u denote the amount of emissions, the nonproductive
abatement capital stock, the emission to production ratio and the abate-
ment to capital ratio, respectively. The firm is confronted with two
taxes, because the government imposes a proportional tax on profíts and
pollution. Furthermore, we assume that both investing in capital goods
that are productive, as well as in capital goods that abate pollution,
generates internal adjustment costs, which in both cases are a convex
function of investment
~1 - ~1(i). ~i(i) ~ o if i ~ o. ~ï(i) ~ o, ~1(0) - o,
P2 - P2{a), p2(a) ~ 0 if a~ 0, p2(a) ) 0, f~2(o) - 0,
(3)
(4)
where pl, ~2, i, a represent the adjustment costs of i, the adjustment
costs of a, the investment rate assigned to the productive capital stock
and the investment rate assigned to the abatement capital stock, respecti-
vely. According to the information described above the present value of
the firm's cash flow can be defined as
m
V~ - f {{1-T1)Cf(k.~) - w,~] - i - pl(i) - a - !~2{a) - T2CPq - mu]}
0
t
exp[- f r(v)dv]dt, (5)
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in which T1, i2, w and r denote the proportional tax on profits, the pro-
portional tax on emissions, the wage rate and the interest rate. We assume
that the firm takes these taxes and prices as given.
The decision problem of the representative firm is to choose time-paths
of investment in both kinds of capital goods and employment that maximize
VO subject to the accumulation equations:




with bl and S2 symbolizing the rate of exponential depreciation for both
capital goods.
Solving the firm's problem is a straightforward exercise of Pontrya-
gin's maximum principle from which the following necessary conditions for
an optimum can be obtained (e.g. Feichtinger and Hartl (1986))
- 1- Pi(i) t ql - 0. (8)
- 1- f~2(a) f q2 - 0. (9)
41 - (rtbl)91 - fk(1-T1) 4 T2pfk,
q2 ' (rts2)q2 - Z2m,
(1-21)f~ - ( 1-T1)w t ~2pf~.
(10)
(12)
where the symbols ql and q2 stand for the shadow prices of the productive
and abatement capital. Equation (12) shows that the marginal revenue of
labor, which is the extra sales after paying profit tax due to one unit
extra labor, equals the marginal cost of labor, which consists of the sum
of the wage rate after taxation and the extra emission tax to be paid
because of the increased production. From (12) we can also derive that
when the government raises one or both taxes, then f~ has to increase as
well in order to keep the equality in (12) satisfied (it is assumed here6
that the wage rate is constant). A higher value of the marginal production
of labor, i.e. f~, implies that the amount of labor per unit of capital
stock has to decrease. Thus, when the government imposes a higher profit
or emission tax rate the firm will react by switching to a more capital
intensive technology.l This feature turns out to be very important in the
remaining analysis.
From equations (8) and (9) we obtain:
i- i(ql), i(1) - 0, i'(ql) ~ 0, (13)
a- a(92), a(1) - 0, a'(q2) ~ 0. (14)
From ( 6), (8) and (10) we get that the steady-state level of productive
capital stock satisfies:
(1-T1)fk -(rtbl){1 t y~i(b1kM)} . T2pfk, kTl ~ 0. kT2 ~ 0, kr C 0. (15)
On the left-hand side of (15) we have the marginal revenue of productive
capital stock net from profit taxation, while on the right-hand side we
find the marginal costs of productive capital stock consisting of the sum
of the discount rate and depreciation rate, corrected for the fact that
1; foi(blkw) dollars are required for a marginal increase of the produc-
tive capital goods level, and of the extra emission tax that must be paid
when the productive capital stock increases with one unit.
The equations (~}, (9) and (11) lead to the following equation for the
steady-state level of the abatement capital goods:2
-------------------------------------------------------
1) Notice that when, like in Gradus and Kort (1991), the amount of emission is
a function of capital stock in stead of output, then in equation (12) the term
T2pF~ would vanish, implying that technology is not influenced by the
government tax policy.
2) Notice that a steady state value of u does not exist if t2 comes close to
zero. However, we assume that the government's disutility of pollution is that
large that it will always fix T2 such, that it is sufficiently high to
guarantee existence of a steady state value of u.7
T2m -(rtó2){1 } g~2(á2u')}, ur ~ 0, u~ ) 0.
2
(16)
Like ( 15), also (16) is a relation that equates marginal revenue to margi-
nal costs, but now for the abatement capital goods. Notice that the margi-
nal revenue of these capital goods consist of the decrease in emission tax
due to an extra unit of abatement capital goods. Following standard con-
trol it is easy to prove that the steady state satisfies saddle-point
stability.
2.2. The model of the consumer
The welfare of consumers positively depends on private consumption (c),
public consumption (g) and negatively on the amount of pollution (e)
U~ - f u(c,g,e)exp(-cst)dt, uc ~ 0, ucc C 0, ug ~, ugg ~ 0,
0
ue C 0, uee C 0,
where a is a(constant) rate of time-preference. Similar to Abel and
Blanchard (1983) and Van de Klundert and Peters (1986) the consumers maxi-
mize U~ with respect to consumption and subject to the dynamic budget
constraint
b- rb f n t w.i - c, (18)
where b and n are the amount of bonds held by the consumer and the obtain-
ed dividends.
Again the standard solution techníque can be applied to obtain necessa-
ry conditions for an optimum
(19)
x - (6-r)x, (20)
where x denotes the costate variable associated to the dynamic budget
constraint.8
To exclude paths from borrowing forever we assume that there are No-
Ponzi-Games
t
lim exp(- f r(v)dv)b(t) - 0. (21)
t~ 0
In Subsection 2.1 we did not say anything about the way the firms finance
their investment. After paying wages to the worker, the firm has to decide
how to distribute profit and finance investment by retained earnings or by
issuing new shares or bonds. For example, we can assume that replacement
investment is financed out of retained earnings and that net investment is
financed by bonds. However, because equity and bonds are treated equally
by the tax system and there is no uncertainty, the conditions of the
Modigliani-Miller theorem hold, thus all financing schemes are equivalent
in the sense that they lead to the same path of total consumption and
investment; they differ, however, in terms of institut.ional arrangements
(for a proof of this see Abel and Blanchard (1983, pp. 680-681)).
2.3. The markets
In this economy there are two markets: the goods and the labor market.
We assume that the goods market is in equilibrium, so that demand is equal
to supply
f(k.~) - c t g f i; P1(i) t a f p2(a). (22)
From this equation the interest rate r, which is the relative price be-
tween current and future consumption, can be derived (e.g. Abel and
Blanchard (1983)).
Concerning the labor market we assume that unions behave myopically.
According to Oswald (1985) this results in a fixed level of wages (it is
also possible to model a labor market, where w is determined by supply).
As a consequence of this fixed wage assumption, the capital-labor ratio
and the marginal productivity of capital are only a function of T1 and Z2,
say d(T1,T2) and h(T1,T2),
R- h(T1,T2)k, hT ~ 0. h,~ ~ 0, (z3a)
1 29
fk - d(T1,~2), dt ~ 0, d,~ ( 0,
1 2
(23b)
where the signs oF the partial derivatives are due to (12) and (15). From
(12) and (23) it can be concluded that the production function can be
expressed as
flk,R) - fkk t f~R - Cd(T1.22) t n(Tl,i2)~k, (24)
(1-tl)wh(T1,T2)
where
n(T1,T2) - 1-~r , ( 1-PT2)
In equations (1)-(24) we have an extended version of the decentralized
Abel and Blanchard model with pollution. From these equations the optimal
values of all variables, except the tax rates T1 and Y2 and government
consumption, can be derived. In the next section we derive the optimal
values of these variables.
3. OPTIMAL GOVERNMENT POLICIES
Before we formulate the necessary conditions for an optimal solution we
make some additional assumptions. First, we assume that the government has
the same utility function as the consumers (cf. Turnovsky and Brock
(1980)), and that the consumers' preferences are of Cobb-Douglas type:
u(c,g,e) - a~n c t(1-a)~n g t(b ~n(e-e), 0~ a~ 1, (Ó ) 0. (25)
Here e can be interpreted as a kind of treshold level (see Dasgupta
(1982)), which means that whenever this level is reached the environment
is irreparably damaged. Hence, it is very worthwhile for the government to
keep the amount of emissions below e.
Second, there is a balanced budget policy, so that public consumption
will be financed from pollution and profit taxation:
g- zl{f(k,~) - w.~} . T2{pq - mu}, (2()10
Third, as already stated before, the government takes into account the way
the consumers and firms behave. In this respect it should be noted that
the consumers' costate variable belonging to the budget constraint, which
is denoted by x, can be eliminated. Substitution of (22) into (19) gives
us a value for x. This elimination of x stems from the fact that the
stream of consumption and investment will not be influenced by financial
streams. Similar to the Abel and Blanchard model the consumers only play a
passive role through clearing the goods market. Furthermore, the equili-
brium of the goods market gives us the interest rate. Following the ap-
proach of e.g. Barro (19~9) we treat the interest rate as exogenous to the
system.3
By using the information obtained until now, the government's problem can
be captured in the following optimal control problem:




k- i(ql) - blk. k(0) - k0 ~ 0' (29)
u- a(q2) - b2u, u(0) - u0 ~ 0, (30)
91 - (rtsl)ql - d(T1,T2)(1-T1) t Z2Pd(21.T2). (31)




3) An alternative could be to let the interest rate depend on the state
variables and the instruments of the government:
r- r(k, u. 91. 92, T1. T2) (27)11
c-{n(T1,T2) f d(T1,T2)}k - T1{n(T1,T2) t d(T1,T2) - wh(T1,T2)}k - i(91)
-~1(i(91))- a(92) - 9~2(a(92)) - TZ{[n(T1,T2) f d(T1,T2)]Pk - mu},
(33)
g- T1{n(T1,T2) t d(T1,T2) - wh(T1,T2)}k 4 T2{[n(T1,T2) t d(T1,T2)]Pk -
mu}, (34)
e- P[n(T1.TZ) t d(T1,T2)]k - m(u).
The Hamiltonian is defined by:
(35)
HG - ae~Cn[{n(T1,T2) t d(T1,T2)}k - T1{n(T1.T2) t d(T1,T2) - wh(T1,T2)}k -
i(91) - 3'1(i(91)) - a(92) - 9~2(a(92)) - T2{[n(T1,T2) t d(T1.T2)]Pk -
mu}] t(1-a)~n[-rl{n(T1,T2) . d(T1,T2) - wh(T1,T2)}k t T2{[n(T1,T2) t
d(T1.TZ)]Pk - mu}] t(~ .in[e - p[n(T1,T2) t d(T1,T2)]k a mu] t
~1{i(ql)-blk} t~2{a(q2) - á2u} . vl{(rtál)91 - d(T1,T2)(1-T1) t
T2pd(T1,T2)} t v2{(rtb2)92 - TZm},
in which:
(36)
al: the government's costate variable of the stock of productive capital
goods
a2: the government's costate variable of the stock of abatement capital
goods
vl: the government's costate variable of the firm's costate variable of
the stock of productive captital goods
v2: the government's costate variable of the firm's costate variable of
the stock of abatement capital goods
For an interior solution the necessary conditions are as follows:
H2 -(-~ ' lga)[(dtn)k - whk ~ T1{(dT ,nT )k - whT k} f T2P(dT ;nT )k] }
1 a 1 1 1 1 1
c(dT .nT )k - ~P(dT tnT )k f (d - (i-T1-T2P)dT )vl - 0. (37)
1 1 e-e 1 1 112
HG -(-a } lg~)LP(dtn)k - mu . T1{(dT 4nT )k - whT k} . T2p(dT tnT )k] . T2 c
-~ 2 2 2 2 2
~(dT tnT )k - P(dT .nT )k t (pd - (1-T1-T2P)dT )L1 - L2m - O,
2 2 e-e 2 2 1
(38)
~1 - (c}bl)~1 f (c -
lga){T1(dtn-wh) . T2p(d{n)} - ~{dtn} t ~p{dtn},
e-e




yl -(~-r-bl)vl 4 ~{i'(ql)(1 i~i(i(ql))} - ali'(ql), vl(o) - 0. (41)
U2 - (a-r-á2)v2 t a'(q2){~ (1 t 9~2(a(92)) -~2}, v2(G) - 0. (42)
Due to the size of the model (four state variables!) it is impossible to
prove saddle-point stability analytically. Similar to Gradus (1991) the
saddle-point property can be proved numerically. In (37) we find four
effects of s marginal profit tax change. The first effect of a marginal
momentarily increase of T1 is a shift from private consumption to public
consumption. This shift consists of three elements. First, publíc consump-
tion increases because the increase of T1 by one unit raises the tax in-
come by (d~n-wh)k and this also equals the extra loss for the private
sector. Second, the marginal profit tax increase decreases the production
per capital good with the amount d tn (cf. (24)) and this in turn re-
T1 T1
duces the amount of profit and emission tax. Third, as already mentioned
in Section 2, the firm reacts on a tax increase by producing more capital
intensively. Therefore, the labor-capital ratio is negatively influenced
(hT ~ 0) and this implies that less labor costs can be subtracted from
1
profit tax. After summing the three elements of the shift and multiplying
this by -~ t lga we arrive at the total utility change due to the shift
from private to public consumption, that is caused by the marginal profit
tax increase.13
The second effect arises from the fact that a marginal profit tax in-
crease reduces the firm's revenue and also the budget for private consump-
tion with the amount (d tn )k. Consequently, utility obtained from pri-
~1 ~1
vate consumption decreases with this term multiplied by a~c.
While the first two effects are related to consumption, the third one
is a pollution effect: the reduction in the amount of production implies
that also the pollution output decreases and this resluts in a positive
utility effect of the value of ---~p(d tn )k (notice that d tn is
negative).
e-e ~1 ~1 T1 ~1
The fourth effect of the increase of profit taxation is that owning
productive capital goods becomes less attractive to the firm, which im-
plies that the firm will reduce investment. This "attractiveness" is mea-
sured by the firm's costate variable of productive capital goods ql, which
can be interpreted as the marginal value of the stock of capital goods.
By solving the differential equation (10) and using the steady state va-
lues of ql and k as Fixed point we obtain the following expression for q:
1
m
ql(t) - f {d(1-21) - T2pdk}exp(-(rtól)(s-t))ds.
t (43)
From (43) we can conclude that a marginal momentarily increase of T1 re-
sults in a decrease of ql by d-(1-T1)dT ft2pd~ units. This decrease can
1 1
be divided into a direct and an indirect effect. The direct effect, re-
presented by d, exactly equals the extra profit tax to be paid by the firm
when il increases by one unit. The indirect effect is caused by the fact
that marginal production of capital goods decreases when the profit tax
rate increases, i.e. d~ ( 0. This leads to reductions in profit and pollu-
1
tion output such, that after tax profits decrease with (1-T1)dT and emis-
1
sion taxes to be paid by the firm decrease with z2pdT . Please notice here
1
that ql stands for the marginal value of capital goods, so that the above
effects are related to one capital good. Due to the fact that vl is the
government's costate variable belonging to ql, the government values the
change of ql by vl(d-(1-T1)d~ ;T2pdT ). A decrease of ql means that the
1 114
firm values investments to be less attractive, and therefore future pro-
ductive capital goods and profits decrease, which results in less profit
taxation income for the government. Thus, the government will assign a
negative value to a decrease of ql, implying that yld is negative so that
vl must be negative.
To summarize: a marginal increase of profit taxation directly leads to
more taxation income for the government, which results in a shift from
private to public consumption, and also directly leads to a decrease of
the attractiveness of investing for the firm, which will have negative
consequences for the firm's future investment policy. But the increase of
T1 will have some indirect effects as well, and they are caused by the
fact that production per capital good decreases and that the firm switches
to a more capital intensive technology. Among these indirect effects we
find a switch from public to private consumption, a decrease of pollution
and a change in the firm's valuation of investment. Now we are able to see
that (37) implies that for an interior solution all marginal effects of an
increase of 21 sum up to zero. This kind of trade off is well known from
Ramsey types of models (e.g. Ramsey (192~)).
The implications of a marginal emission tax change can be found in (38).
Here, like in the case of a marginal profit tax change, the shift from
private to public consumption also consists of three elements, where the
two elements arising from changes in the production per capital good and
the labor-capital ratio have the same structure. In the case of a marginal
emission tax change the other element results from the fact that rasing
the emission tax rate with one unit leads to an extra taxation income for
the government that equals p(dtn)k-mu. Because of the government balanced
budget policy this implies a shift from private consumption to public
consumption and the change in government utility due to this shift equals
(p(dtn)k - mu)(-a~c t (1-~)~g). Analogous to the second and third effect
of a marginal profit tax change, an increase of the emission tax rate by
one unit results in a decrease of private consumption and of environmental
pollution. This leads to a utility change that equals (d ;n )k(~~c -
T2 T2
p~~(e-e)).
Another effect of a higher emission tax rate is that pollution output
becomes more costly to the firm, and therefore the attractiveness of15
owning polluted capital goods decreases. This attractiveness is measured
by qi and from (43) we obtain that increasing i2 momentarily with one unit
leads to a decrease of qi with pd-(1-~[i)di tT2pd,~ . The government values
2 2
this decrease with vi(pd-(1-Ti)d,t tTZpd,~ ).
2 2
But, pollution output becoming more costly also implies that owning
abatement capital goods, which diminish pollution, becomes more attractive
to the firm. This is measured by the firm's costate variable of abatement
capltril goods qZ. According to un nn~ilogous dcrivnl.iou ~iv for (~I"j), y~ c~uri
be expressed by:
m
q2(t) - f T2m exp(-(rtb2)(s-t))dt.
t
(46)
Hence, increasing T2 by one unit implies an increase of q2 by m units,
where m equals the extra decrease of pollution output due to a marginal
increase of u. The government values this increase of q2 by -v2m, because
v2 is the government's costate variable of q2. The fact that the abatement
capital goods become more attractive to the firm is positively valued by
the government, because it implies that the firm's abatement investments
will increase so that the firm's pollution output will decrease. Hence, v2
will be negative.
To summarize: an increase of the emission tax rate has the same effects as
changing the profit tax rate, but the magnitudes of the effects differ.
However, the increase of the emission tax rate also has an extra effect
due to the fact that the willingness to invest in abatement capital goods
increases, because polluting the environment becomes more costly to the
firm. Due to this additional effect we can draw the important conclusion
that imposing an emission tax stimulates investment in abatement capital
goods. The latter cannot be achieved by imposing a profit tax because the
profitability of abatement investments is independent from the level of
the profit tax rate. Equation (38) says that within the interior solution
alle effects of a marginal increase of the emission tax rate sum up to
zero.16
So far, we described an optimal taxation plan for the government. How-
ever, this optimal plan is time-inconsistent, because there is an incen-
tive for the government to reoptimize and reconsider its tax strategy at
some later date. From the point of view of stimulating productive capital
accumulation the government should announce a policy of low profit tax
rate and low emission tax rate. This means that the government gives up a
piece of its government consumption to stimulate capital accumulation.
But, on the other hand more productive capital implies more pollution
output and, therefore, it would be recommendable to accompany stimulation
of accumulating productive capital goods with stimulating accumulation of
abatement capital goods. This can be done by announcing a high emission
tax rate. Of course this would imply a high tax income for the government
which results in a high level of public consumption because of the balanc-
ed budget assumption (cf. (26)), but it also leads to a decrease budget
for private consumption. Hence there are two contrary mechanisms working
on fixing the emission tax rate. On the one hand, it should be low to
stimulate productive capital accumulation and on the other hand it should
be high to diminish pollution output. This is reflected in the occurence
of vl as well as v2 in equation (38).
Once the productive capital is installed, the government has an incen-
tive to renege on its announcement and to introduce a higher tax rate on
both profit and pollution. From point of view of installation of abatement
capital: once this is done the government should like to fix the value of
T2 lower than the one announced in order to make a shift from the too high
public consumption to private consumption. Notice that the government's
costates belonging to the firm's costates of both capital goods (i.e, vl
and v2) must equal zero at the start of the planning period, because the
firm's costates are free to jump at that point of time and, therefore,
they become effectively additional policy instruments for the government.
If the government has the possibility at some later point of time to make
a new initial plan, those costates belonging to the firm's costates again
become zero. The more the vl deviates from zero the more the government
can gain by manipulating ql through letting the tax rates T1 and Y2 devia-
te from the original plan, thus through cheating the firm. The same holds
for v2 in connection with manipulating q2 through changing the tax rate17
T2. In this way ~yl~ and ly2l can be interpreted as the government's costs
for sticking to its announced plan.
If the firm has no reason to believe that the government will stick to
its initial plan, the concept used in this section, which corresponds to
an open-loop equilibrium of a Stackelberg game, is no longer a useful
concept. In the literature three main streams can be qualified for solving
the problem of time-inconsistency. The first attempt is what is called the
loss of leadership (cf. Buiter (1983)). In this view the government gives
up its role as leader and the interactions between private sector and
government is viewed as a Nash rather than a Stackelberg dynamic game. The
acceptance of this view would, however, mean the denial of existence of
policies which have announcement effects. such as tax policíes. Secondly,
memory strategies, threats and incentives can be used to sustain the time-
inconsistent solution (cf. Backus and Driffill (1985), Barro and Gordon
(1983)). Thirdly, we can use recursive or so-called feedback methods. The
present government's leadership is preserved with respect to the private
sector, but it is lost with respect to future governments, which are free
to optimize.
The aim of the next section is to use the third approach to solve the
time-inconsistency problem. Hence, for the model under consideration we
derive the feedback Stackelberg solution in the next section.
4. THE FEEDBACK STACKELBERG EQUILIBRIUM
In this section we derive the feedback Stackelberg equilibrium for the
model described in the previous sectiona. By constructing this equilibrium
we assume that the firms ignore their influence on the level of taxation.
So, this equilibrium can be interpreted as the nocommitment equilibrium
with "atomistic" behavior of firms and consumers. Due to these additional
assumptions it is possible to obtain the feedback Stackelberg equilibrium
by putting the costate variables yl and y2 equal to zero4 (cf. conditions
4) For a proof that it is possible to construct the feedback Stackelberg
equilibrium in such a way in these kinds of models, see Gradus (1991, pp. 1~2-
176).18
(37)-(42)).
If vl and v2 equal zero the following sufficient condition for satis-
faction of the conditions ( 37) and (38) can be established:
a -~- 1-a -~-0.
c e-e g e-e
(47)
If equation (47) holds then the utility of assigning an additional unit of
production to private consumption or to public consumption equals the
disutility of the emissions caused by the production process of this addi-
tional unit. This implies that total utility of marginal production equals
zero. The optimality of this rule is easy to understand, because when
utility of extra consumption and disutility of extra emissions due to
marginal production do not balance, then either one unit increase or one
unit reduction of the production at that moment will lead to an increase
of total utility.
In the open-loop equilibrium the government is able to give up a piece
of its government consumption to stimulate accumulation of productive
capital goods by announcing low profit and emiasion tax rates. It can also
stimulate abatement capital accumulation by announcing a high emission tax
rate. which causes a decrease of private consumption. In the feedback
equilibrium the government is not able to stimulate abatement investments,
because the firms do not believe such tax policy announcements due the
fact that, in absence of any commitment, the government can deviate any
time. This leads to the conclusion that in the feedback equilibrium the
profit tax rate will be higher and the productive capital stock will be
lower. Due to the contrary announcement effects of the emission tax rate
nothing can be said about the level of emission tax when we compare the
open-loop and feedback equilibrium. Because productive capital goods will
be higher in the open-loop equilibrium we conjecture that then also abate-
ment capital stock will be higher in order to keep the emissions at a
reasonable level.
The nature of the solutions examined may be further classified by a
numerical example. Assume quadratic adjustment costs for both functions
Sol(i) - nl.i2, (48)19
~2(a) - R2.a2,
and a Cobb-Douglas production function
(49)
f(k ~) - k~~l-S
(50)
Furthermore, choose the following parameter values: w- 0.5. nl -~2 - 4,
~- 0.375. bl - b2 - 0.05. a- 0.75. o- 0.03. ~- 0.1, P- 2, m- 2,
e- 1. The steady-state values for the open-loop and feedback Stackelberg
equilibrium can be found by a numerical procedure and they are given in
Table 1.
[insert Table 1]
This example clearly reveals the differences between the open-loop and
feedback equilibria. First, it can be checked that in the feedback equili-
brium equation (47) holds so that marginal utility of production equals
zero. This rule is not valid in the open-loop case because the marginal
utility of public consumption ((1-a)~g) exceeds the marginal utility of
private consumption (a~c) as well as the marginal disutility of emissions
(p~~(e-e)). Apparently, the government has given up a piece of its public
consumption in order to stimulate investments by announcing low taxes.
This is confirmed by the fact that in the open-loop equilibrium the pro-
ductive capital stock is higher and the profit tax rate is lower than in
the feedback equilibrium. But the emission tax rate is higher in the open-
loop equilibrium which means that this tax rate is used here to stimulate
abatement investments rather than to stimulate productive investments.
This resulted in a higher level of abatement capital stock and also in a
lower level of emissions compared to the feedback equilibrium. Further-
more, as should expected the steady-state utility in the open-loop equili-
brium is higher than in the feedback equilibrium.
Now let us suppose that new alarming information about the magnitude of
the greenhouse effect becomea available. Through this information the
parameters of the pollution (cf. (2)) change in such a way, that produc-
tion causes more pollution and abatement activities become less effective.
Therefore, the parameter p changes from 0.2 to 0.225 and m from 0.2 tozo
0.175. Also, the government reacts by assigning a greater disutility to
C02-emissions such that the parameter ~ increases from 0.1 to 0.15. The
steady state values of the problem with these parameter changes are depic-
ted in Table 2.
[insert Table 2]
After comparing Tables 1 and 2 we can conclude that the government reveals
the higher importance of reducing emissions in raising the emission tax
rate. The firm reacts by reducing (mostly productive) investments with
such an amount that, despite the increase of p and the decrease of m, in
the open-loop case emissions remain at the same level while emissions even
decrease in the feedback equilibrium. Of course, private and public con-
sumption are negatively influenced by the decrease of productive capital
stock.
5. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper the impact of profit and emission tax on dynamic firm
behavior is studied within a general equilibrium model. The tax rates are
determined endogenously by assuming that the government maximizes utility.
The problem is formulated as a Stackelberg differential game with the
government as leader, which is studied for the open-loop as well as the
feedback case.
The optimal level of the firms' productive capital stock is determined
by an equality between net marginal revenue and marginal costs, where the
latter consists of the cost of capital, corrected for adjustment costs,
plus marginal emission tax expenses. The level of the abatement capital
stock is optimal when the marginal emission tax decrease equals the margi-
nal cost of abatement capital. The optimal employment level also satisfies
a marginal-revenue-equal-to-marginal-cost-relation, where the marginal
cost consists of the sum of marginal wage and emission cost. From this
relation it can be inferred that the firms switch to a more capital inten-
sive technology as soon as the government raises one or both of the profit
and emission tax rates.zi
Both profit and emission tax rates are fixed such that all marginal
effects sum up to zero. Among the effects of a marginal profit tax increa-
se we find a shift from private to public consumption, a switch to a more
capital intensive technology and a decrease of the attractiveness of in-
vestment for the firm. An increase of the emission tax causes the above
effects too, but, because emissions are more heavily punished, it also
raises the profitability of abatement investments. This implies that an
important difference between the implications of imposing a profit tax and
an emission tax is that only through the latter abatement activities can
be stimulated.
In the open-loop equilibrium the optimal taxation policy is time-incon-
sistent. Time-inconsistency arises because the government wants to stimu-
late accumulation of productive capital goods, which is done by announcing
low (profit and emission) tax rates, as well as accumulation of abatement
capital goods, which can be achieved by announcing a high emission tax
rate. In the feedback equilibrium these announcements are not credible
because the government can deviate at any time. Consequently the profit
tax rate will be higher in the feedback equilibrium, which results in
lower level of productive capital goods. Because the emission tax rate
should be low for stimulating productive capital goods accumulation and
high for stimulating abatement capital goods accumulation, nothing can be
said about whether the emission tax rate increases or decreases when those
accumulation stimulations are no longer credible. In the feedback equili-
brium it holds that the utility of marginal production equals zero, imply-
ing that the utility from extra consumption is counterbalanced by the
disutility from extra emissions caused by the additional unit of produc-
tion.
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